



Gertrude Bell and the Genesis of Sectarian Division in Modern Iraq

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Sectarian jargon has become part and parcel of the Iraqi political scene after 2003. Sectarian phenomenon, however, has always been part of Iraqi political life at least since the creating of Iraqi state in 1921. This study, examines specifically the British role in creating the sectarian division in Iraq as viewed by Iraqi Shi'is. Iraqi Shi'is have always put forward their claim as the most affected by the political division resulted after 1921. The paper will present first a varied spectrum of reflections for Shi'a intellectuals and 'ulama of enduring British role. I shall review then an historical evolution of Shi'a-British encounter to assess finally, how this experience has shaped the attitudes and mentality of present Shi'a personals and forces in Iraq.



On the 10th anniversary of the American invasion of Iraq, Dominic Lawson wrote in the Independent that Gertrude Bell, who drew the map of new Iraqi state, was hoping to create ‘a model for the entire Middle East- just as President George W Bush had believed that US-imposed democracy in Iraq would act as a model for the region at the dawn of the 21st century’.² The claim that Bell was obsessed with the noble hope of creating an Iraqi model that might be a good example to be imitated by other neighboring countries is astonishing and jarring. Of course, such claim seems inconsistent with Bell’s view, which did not claim or dream of democratic Iraq. However, Lawson’s article, probably among many others, endeavors to see the current picture in Iraq through the past British experience.

Some writers would advocate that one outcome of the American invasion of Iraq, has been the convulsion of the sectarian identities within Shi’a and Sunni communities in Iraq and in the Arab and Islamic world in general. Accordingly, sectarian division among Iraqis has been portrayed as new phenomenon resulted and brought about by the American invasion.

However, it is out of context of this paper to deal with sectarian rhetoric

or practices in Iraq or the Arab and Islamic world. This paper, instead, will limit its concerns to the role played by Gertrude Bell (the famous British politician scholar and archeologist) in Iraqi politics by: 1. reviewing the opinions of some Shi’a activists of Bell role in founding the sectarian bases of the Iraqi state in 1921, 2. reviewing briefly the course of relationship between British and Iraqi Shi’is, 3. reading specifically Bell’s views of Shi’a community and how this affected her role in Iraqi politics, and finally presenting some reflections and assessment.

Iraqi Shi’is and *Abu Naji*

Abu Naji is a derogatory nickname used especially by the Iraqi Shi’is to denote the British. Iraqi Shi’is have been accustomed, and still until today, to use *Abu Naji* as a notorious nickname for British officials who worked in Iraq during and after the British occupation of Iraq in the First World War. Ordinary Iraqis have transformed *Abu Naji* into a wicked creature who is blamed for every sin in the world. Obviously, this constructs part of ‘the conspiracy theory’ that associated with the British, who are held responsible, according to Iraqi Shi’a, for their bad lot that came into effect after 1920 up until April 2003.³



The end of Saddam's regime was doubtless an end for the Sunni domination of Iraqi state that lasted for around a century. Indeed, the second Iraqi state that established in 2003 represents the stark contrary of the state that was constructed in 1921. While Iraq of 1921 was designed solely by the British, Iraq of 2003 shaped almost by the Americans. Hassan al-'Alawi, an eminent Shi'a Arab nationalist writer and activist argues that post-2003 Iraq is the opposite of 1921 one. He labeled Iraq that was created after 1920 'British Iraq'. By contrast, the Iraqi state that has been designed after 2003 is an American Iraq dominated largely by Iraqi Shi'is.⁴ I will come later to al-'Alawi when I speak about the Shi'a critics who placed the blame on the British for the plight of Iraqi Shi'a.

The British role in creating the sectarian division in Iraq has been subject to harsh criticisms of exclusively Iraqi Shi'is. I will examine here three examples. The first example is Muhammad Hussain Kashif al-Ghita, the most politically active *mujtahid* in the Shi'a world during the 1930s up until mid-1950s. Kashif al-Ghita, who was depicted by the British as anti-British and anti-Zionist, was surprisingly enough less keen in confronting British in 1920. Probably, this was due to his close attachment to his

mentor and master, Sayyed Kadhim al-Yazdi, who expressed less hostile attitude towards the British and probably for this reason was considered friend to them. In his account of the 1920 Iraqi revolution, which only recently published, Kashif al-Ghita reveals that the main driving forces behind the revolution were the Baghdadi opportunists, referring to the Sunni nationalists in particular, who pushed the Shi'a tribes to fight against the British simply for making good deal for themselves.

It is clear that Kashif al-Ghita, who made comparison between the characters of Mirza Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi and al-Yazdi, was apt to show the good character of the later, namely al-Yazdi, for his deep insights, sound judgments and cautious manner standing as the opposite model for al-Shirazi's. Kashif al-Ghita explains that those who triggered the rising had succeeded with al-Shirazi but failed with al-Yazdi.⁵ Kashif al-Ghita's account, resembles to great extent, that provided by Bell herself when she spoke of the increase in the 'Nationalist propaganda' during the 1920 revolution.⁶

Kashif al-Ghita, nonetheless, has placed great deal of blame on the British for their divisive policy in Iraq. Kashif al-Ghita was approached in 1954 by the American



and British ambassadors in Baghdad and received invitation to take part at a conference organized by the Americans. As Americans were alert by communisms ascendance in Iraq, so Kashif al-Ghita was signaled as one of the most opponents of communism. Convened in Lebanon, the conference brought Christian and Muslim scholars to discuss the challenges that confront both Christianity and Islam, most notably by their perceived Communist opponent. Kashif al-Ghita, who declined the invitation, proffered his ideas in a treatise. In it, he maintained that 'threat of Communism cannot be thwarted unless freedom and social justice is fulfilled, through uprooting sources of oppression and aggression'. While he condemns the partition of Palestine and the British and French imperial role in the East, Kashif al-Ghita alleviates the 'danger posed by Communism in comparison with the previous threat. Communism, argued Kashif al-Ghita, neither invaded an Arab country, nor took over any land or wealth. It is you (the English) who should take the blame for the Cold War and the Communist penetration in every country including Najaf'.⁷

The second example would be Hassan al-'Alawi. Al-'Alawi, who does not save criticisms of Iraqi nationalists (notably Sunnis) for

their failure in building a fair Iraqi state, put it clearly that the Iraqi Sunni politicians were driven by their personal and communal interests rather than the nation as a whole. Al-'Alawi refers in particular to the exceptional and critical part played by Bell in creating the new state after 1920. He also directs his anger towards the opportunistic approach pursued by Sunni figures like Muzahim al-Pachachi and 'Abdul Rahman al-Naqib and others who secured their political future by allying themselves with the British and did not shy from attacking the position of Iraqi Shi'a.⁸ The British intended, al-'Alawi argues, to solidify the narrow nationalist project, concentrated on a small Sunni elite, as a good means to deter any real national state or left-oriented regime in Iraq.⁹

The British, notably Bell's role has been present within the literature of the Shi'a political movement since its inception in late 1950s. 'Abdul Salam 'Arif 's policies were subject of fierce criticism of new Shi'a activists as well as the Shi'a *marja'iyya* of Sayyed Muhsin al-Hakim (d.1970). In response to the controversial political and economic measures taken by 'Abdul Salam 'Arif (1963-66) and midst very tense political and ideological struggle between 'Arif's regime and the Shi'a *marja'iyya* in Najaf, the Shi'a



political movement began to circulate publications and announcements that highlighted the sectarian phase of this regime. Renouncing denominational and sectarian policies targeting the Shi'a community has become a recurring theme brought out by Shi'i 'ulama here and there. According to *al-Adhwa*, sectarianism remains persistent and Shi'i people are still experiencing this sectarian bias in the form of intellectual and social oppression.¹⁰

Again, this call resounded clearly and openly by *al-Hayae al-'Almayya fi al-Najaf al-Ashraf* (the Association of Scholars in Honored Najaf) in February 1964 during a religious festival held in Najaf. The Association highlighted the situation of Shi'i people in Iraq and their grievances 'they encounter in all fields, where the state controls everything leaving, for example, no role in education and endowments, for the *Ja'fari madhhab* (doctrine) which is treated in appalling way'.¹¹

Shi'i 'ulama, poets and preachers began a campaign of attacking what they considered a new sectarian tendency that was poisoning the government institutions, trying to deprive Shi'i people their due rights.¹² This cry, however, expressed for the first the emerging Iraqi Shi'i identity, emphasizing more on the Shi'i role in building the

new Iraqi state. In retrospect of the 1920 Iraqi Revolution, a Shi'i editor highlights a contradiction between the sacrifices made by Shi'i rebels to establish the new Iraqi state and their current miserable situation where only some Iraqis privileged over others because of a sectarian, tribal and racial basis. The writer continues:

'Courageous and crucial standings showed by the Euphrates and the lower south (Shi'is), are the bright pages of Iraqi history. Unluckily, these people, who constitute the majority of this nation, denied of their rights, abused and dubbed in bad character'.¹³

For both Shi'i faithful and secularists, the Iraqi Revolution of 1920 has come to appear as a crucial moment of new Iraqi history that coincided with betrayal and anguish caused by authoritative Sunni elites. 'Arif's government seems to have triggered feelings of betrayal among Shi'is, the sense that had been prevailing during the monarchy era as a lip service paid to address Shi'a calls and demands. Thus, the main theme that runs through all of these announcements might be succinctly translated into one message: the Iraq Shi'is, the real defenders of Iraq lost the power for small Sunni group, which tries to perpetuate its domination. This message became



recurrent and present during the next four decades.

It is not surprising, thus, that during the escalating pressure of Saddam's rule against the Shiites in the 1980s; some Shi'a editors dedicated a long chapter to the 1920 Iraqi revolution. In this chapter, anonymous writers (but surly Shi'a) analyze the Shi'a role in confronting the British policy in Iraq, paying their attention to the *'ulama*, and pointing out Bell's grave role in mapping the new state of Iraq to suit the British interest.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the question arise: how the relationship between British and Iraqi Shi'a developed and how this relation got to irrecoverable point? The next part will review the course of this relationship as this makes better understanding of Bell's role in this question.

The British and the Shi'a challenge

Admittedly, the British forces met a real and formidable Shi'a challenge between 1914 and 1920. Violence broke out three times between the British and Shi'is; the first when the British troops landed in the last weeks of 1914 at Fao (south of Iraq), were they were confronted by a joint force of Ottoman and Shi'a fighters. The Shi'i *'ulama* of the holy cities put aside their enmity towards the Turks, and turned their attention to the urgent holy task. Najaf became

the main base for *mujahideen* and the driving force for the *Jihad Campaign* under the command of Sayyed Muhammad Sa'id al-Haboobi. With the support of other *mujtahids* such as Mahdi al-Haydari and Mahdi al-Khalisi, al-Haboobi mobilized his fighters to the south to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Ottomans against the British. After fierce fighting, the British forces managed to defeat the Turks and *mujahideen*, compelling them to retreat.¹⁵

The second episode took place when a group of armed Najafis killed on 19 March 1918, Captain Marshal, one of the British Army Political Officers stationed near Najaf. This incident was planned by a secret society founded in Najaf in 1918 called *Jam'ayat al-Nahdha al-Islamiyah* (the League of the Islamic Renaissance). The society consisted of a diversity of members: junior *'ulama*, tribal chiefs, ordinary Najafis and supported by good section of *Zhurt* armed members.¹⁶ The mastermind behind this society was Muhammad Jawad al-Jazaeri, a junior *Mujtahid* of a renowned Najafi family. Najafis endured the British siege for almost two months. British forces attacked Najaf with cannons, and water and food supply was cut. The city surrendered to the British, who captured rebels, executed eleven of them and



deported more than one hundred of those involved in the uprising.¹⁷

The third, of course, was far-reaching and considered the straw that broke the back of the camel; namely the 1920 Iraqi revolution. It is important to note here that between 1917 and 1920, the relationship between the Shi'a and the British deteriorated steadily. The death of al-Yazdi on 27 Rajab 1337/ 30 April 1919 opened the road not only for the ascent of Mirza Taqi al-Shirazi as the sole *marja'i*, but also for a dramatic change in Iraqi history.

In fact, British officials attempted to promote their relationship with al-Shirazi;¹⁸ however, these attempts ended to no avail as al-Shirazi had a different temperament and came under the influence of his son, Muhammad Rida and the active Iraqi nationalist groups. We should admit that British contacts with the Shi'i *'ulama* came to a breaking point because of short sight and harsh policies that pursued by few British officials in some Shi'a areas.

Two incidents might have contributed to aggravate the sentiments of both Shi'a *'ulama* and tribal chiefs; arresting of al-Shirazi's son, Muhammad Rida in June 1920 followed by arresting Shalan Abu al-Chon, the strong Shaikh of Dhawalim in al-Rumaitha.¹⁹ These two incidents probably convinced

both tribal chiefs and Shi'a *'ulama* to work together as no hope would be brought about from following a peaceful approach with the British. In March 1920, just three months before the 1920 Revolution, Gertrude Bell complained that:

'It's a problem here how to get into touch with the Shiah, not the tribal people in the country; we're on intimate terms with all of them, but the grimly devout citizens of the holy towns and more especially the leaders of religious opinion, the Mujtahids, who can loose and bind with a word... And for the most part they are very hostile to us, a feeling we can't alter because it's so difficult to get at them'.²⁰

Mirza al-Shirazi soon became the vocal point about the events occurring and approached by both Sunni and Shi'a figures. Shi'a social and religious concerns transformed now into sheer political claims and demands. Political societies, especially *Haras al-Istiqlal* (the Guardians of Independence), threw their weight behind al-Shirazi. In addition, tribal chiefs in the Mid-Euphrates were in regular contacts with al-Shirazi. In his reply to a question concerning the rule of Iraq, al-Shirazi clearly put it: 'None but Muslims have any right to rule over Muslims'.²¹

Thus, when the 1920 revolution quelled in October 1920, the British



sensed the difficulty of managing the business of Iraqi state. The importance of the 1920 Iraqi revolution was that it affected and modified the lines of the British policies in Iraq from, direct into indirect rule. In this sense, it made the British more open to recruit some Iraqis for administrating the new state. Surely, the main question that put before the British administration was: Who are the suitable and reliable people who should commissioned for governing Iraq?

Bell and the Shi'a issue

No doubt, Bell was at the heart of Iraq and Shi'a issue. Her significant position as Wilson's oriental secretary meant that she was in charge to influence and directly steer the direction of British policies at least since she had good connections with Iraqis. Bell, in fact, has reflected her personal opinion, which echoed ongoing political situation in Iraq. Bell, for instance, had constructed positive impression of the Shi'a feeling at the end of January 1918 shortly after visiting both Najaf and Karbala. She noticed that the situation was 'generally quiet; there were at that time no signs of serious resistance to the British' as 'the alienation of the Shias has been a great asset to us and has meant for instance that we have never had any serious religious

feeling to contend with in Karbala' and Najaf'.²²

However, the confrontation between the Shi'a and the British added new factor to the political situation. From then onwards, Bell, started to speak of 'no contact with the grimly devout citizens of the holy towns and more especially the leaders of religious opinions, the Mujtahids'. They were all 'bitterly pan-Islamic' and 'anti-British'.²³ Amide this collision of interests between British and Shi'a majority, British officials had to find their way in Iraq. Broadly speaking, British officials were divided into two groups; those who thought of controlling Iraq through Iraqis, and this represented mainly by Bell and those who argued for continuation of British administration with giving positions to Iraqis to prepare them for the next step, and this group was represented by Wilson. As Peter Sluglett has put in:

'One of Gertrude Bell's great strengths lay in her flexibility and her ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Whereas Wilson never really accepted that nationalism was a force which would have to be accommodated, Gertrude Bell eventually came to realise that at least some concession must be made'.²⁴ One of the main points of conflict between A. T. Wilson and Bell was the issue of handing power



to Iraqis and establishing the Iraqi government. Wilson was of the view that:

‘The population is so deeply divided by racial and religious cleavages, and the Shia majority after two hundred years of Sunni domination are so little accustomed to hold high office that any attempt to introduce institutions, on the lines desired by the advanced Sunni politicians of Syria, would involve the concentration of power in the hands of a few persons whose ambitions and methods would rapidly bring about the collapse of organised government’.²⁵

On contrary to this, Bell suggested that Shi’a should not be allowed any chance to share the power. Writing on the last days of the revolution, Bell asserted clearly that British intend to give no share for Shi’is in the Iraqi governance. She wrote on 3 October 1920 that:

‘The Shi’ah problem is probably the most formidable in this country. But if you’re going to have anything like really representative institutions - always remember that the Turks hadn’t; there wasn’t a single Shi’ah deputy - you would have a majority of Shi’ahs. For that reason as ‘Abdul Majid wisely said, you can never have 3 completely autonomous provinces. Sunni Mosul must be retained as a part of the Mesopotamian state in order to

adjust the balance. But to my mind it’s one of the main arguments for giving Mesopotamia responsible govt. We as outsiders can’t differentiate between Sunni and Shi’ah but leave it to them and they’ll get over the difficulty by some kind of hanky panky, just as the Turks did, and for the present it’s the only way of getting over it. I don’t for a moment doubt that the final authority must be in the hands of the Sunnis, in spite of their numerical inferiority; otherwise you will have a mujtahid-run, theocratic state, which is the very devil. There are two favourable considerations: one is that the failure of the rising, which as far as the tribes are concerned, was all due directly to mujtahid incitement, may considerably discredit those worthies as temporal guides; and the second that the present premier mujtahid is tottering into his grave - we most regrettably prevented him from falling into it a year ago when he was saved by our medical officer at Najaf [Najaf, An] - and he may be succeeded by someone more enlightened. There are such, even among mujtahids.’²⁶

Bell even went further to speak now in different mood, that Shi’a leaders ‘ wholly overlooking the fact that nearly all their leading men are Persian subjects and must change their nationality before they can hold



office in the Mesopotamian State'.²⁷ This statement, we may notice, provided good political bases and pretext for the later steps executed by Abdul Muhsin al-Sa'dun in June 1923, when the latter deported the great mujtahids; Shaikh Mahdi al-Khalisi, Mirza Muhammad Hussein al-Na'ini and Abu al-Hassan al-Isfahani. No doubt, 'the Persian label' has become a deadly weapon by the hands of successive Sunni governments, whenever and wherever suite them.

We should insist that Bell was undeniably not alone in her unhealthy and antagonistic attitude towards the Shi'a. Thomas Lyell probably provides brilliant example of the prevalent anti-Shi'a mode within the British officials in Iraq. In his book, Lyell, put it in no more clear words that his main purpose behind writing his book was to 'show that the Muslims, and particularly the Shia', is –and for many years must remain-totally unfit for self-government, which he only 'desires' as an opportunity to escape from all law and order'.²⁸

Few observers, although admired Bell's role, expertise and courage, criticized her attitude towards the Shi'a. Abdullah al-Nifisi, who became after 2003 one of the most aggressive commentator against the 'Shi'a conspiracy' admits that Bell had a first hand experience that

surpassed other British officials, and here ability to understand Iraq and Iraqi people, yet she was unable to understand the political behavior of Shi'a 'ulama, al-Shirazi, for instance. Al-Nifisi attributes this to the fact that Bell's passions and sentiments sometimes overcame over here subjectivity. Al-Nifisi explains that Bell's statements concerning the Iraqi issues were not established on facts, notably that taking place in the Middle Euphrates region, where antagonism to the British was high.²⁹

Nasr even accuses Bell of romanticism. Nasr state that while she successfully 'determined the course of history'..., conceiving the new state and its future 'power in it', she nonetheless 'harbored deep suspicions of the Shia and had little patience for their prickly religious leaders, who she believed had most to do with the revolt against the British at the end of the war and who had always been a thorn in the side of her colleagues in neighboring Iran'. Bell's attitude, according to Nasr, was due to the fact that 'the Shi'a and their religious leaders did not fit Bell's romantic view of Arabs. She did not know them, at least not as well as she knew the tribal leaders that she visited on her tours of the desert. The world of Najaf was alien to her and would not have any place in the country that



she imagined. The new state of Iraq would be entrusted to Sunnis'.³⁰

Assessment and retrospect

What happened in Iraq after 2003 may resounded to great extent the experiences of Iraqis in 1920. In retrospect of the first Iraqi State of 1920, we consider three factors that contributed in different ways to the state-building processes.

1. There was deep negative attitude among the British officials towards the Shi'a *'ulama*. This attitude was resulted from the collision between British and the Shi'a *'ulama* and in particular Shi'a tribe chiefs in the Middle Euphrates. As we noticed, between 1915 and 1917, the British were working hard to construct normal relationships with both Sunni and Shi'a *'ulama* and tribal Shaikhs. Obviously, Bell and other British official maintained cordial relations with tribal Shaikhs both Shi'a and Sunni. No less important, was the success that British officials seem to have gained among Shi'i *'ulama*, most importantly with Sayyed Kadhim al-Yazdi. This explains the lukewarm position of both Shi'a *'ulama* and tribal chiefs in the support of the Najaf uprising of 1918.³¹ Thus, during the Najafi uprising of 1917, al-Yazdi showed no sympathy to the pleas of the rebels. In fact, al-Yazdi:

'defended his position with the argument that he was a man of

religion and had nothing to do with politics, he nonetheless repeatedly told British officials that he opposed rebellion and he showed his satisfaction at the crushing of the leaders of the quarters'.³²

A British report stated that:

'It is difficult to overestimate the value to us of Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim's unbroken support. Provided his name is never quoted officially, we can invariably count upon him for help'.³³ Not surprisingly, immediately after the failure of the uprising and execution of its leaders, rumors spread in Najaf depicting al-Yazdi as a covert agent working for the British.³⁴ Bell has obviously maintained good networks of relationship with the Shi'a tribal shaikhs and even *'ulama*. For example, she held a long meeting with Sayyed Hassan al-Sadr in Kadhamayya on March 1920. In general, however, the Shi'a *'ulama* were reluctant to deal with the British. Unlike their Sunni counterpart, Shi'a *'ulama* were more cautious to involve themselves in political maneuverings. Sayyed Kadhim al-Yazdi, as we noticed, was insulted and treated like a traitor in Najaf and his reputation as a leading scholar came under attack.³⁵ In addition, al-Wardi, relates how Hassan al-Sadr, insulted by the people in Kadhamayya.³⁶



2. During and in particular after the 1920 revolution, there had been a serious and real tension between two broad camps: the Shi'a camp represented by *Haras al-Istiqlal* (the Guardians of the Independence) and the Iraqi al-'Ahad, which composed solely of Sunni personals. The first camp was calling for nothing short of the full withdrawal of the British forces from Iraq. The second group was taking more realistic approach, calling for some co-operation with the British. Among the Sunni camp, however, there were some opportunists, who saved no effort to attack the Shi'a camp. This group led mainly by Abdul Rahman al-Naqib, who tightened his relations with the British and Bell in particular. Al-Naqib has played critical role not only in influencing Bell's image of the Shi'a but also in consolidating the Sunni hold of power.

However, we should agree with Jurgen Osterhammel that relationship between 'colonial state and individual groups or classes of colonized society', should analysed and understood as 'a convergence of interests' rather than described as 'collaboration'.³⁷ It is only under this understanding that we could analyse and comprehend the behaviour of not only the Sunni individuals who took the initiative to make a deal with the British in 1920 but also the

Shi'a attitude to do the same with the Americans after 2003. This brings me to the last point.

3. The miscalculation of the Shi'a *mujtahids*,³⁸ who showed great sympathy towards the cause of Ottoman Islamic state, the obsolescent state, that was in its way to fade away. Although Iraqi Shi'is had been victims of this state, which considered and treated them as second class citizens, Shi'is were to defend its banner as we stated. This political miscalculation continued notably after the 1920 revolution. The Sunni elite became more concerned with their political interest rather than defending the rights of their Shi'a brothers. The Sunni attitude left marked stamp on the Shi'a future thinking as they felt deep hurt by the Sunni pragmatism, who took this opportunity to intensify the isolation of the Shi'a majority. This difference in attitudes has been affected and shaped by their diverged religio-political worldview. In contrast to Sunnism, which has long ago moved politics into the civilian sphere, taking a more 'realistic' approach and keeping the role of clerics to a minimum, Shi'a Islam has always associated politics with Imamate as a divine position.³⁹ With this understanding, Shi'a Islam has always viewed politics through an 'idealistic' and 'utopian' lens, which



increasingly regarded the political sphere in modern times as a space for corruption and immorality.⁴⁰ Even within the civilian domain, Shi'a politicians are almost always associated with religious institutions, as they continued a clear tendency of reconciling political ends with religious doctrines.

Not surprising, the attitude of the Shi'a 'ulama after 2003 reflected and recalled more their historical memory (read miscalculation) and this explains their attitude towards the toppling of Saddam regime. Obviously, the leading 'ulama in Najaf and the Shi'a Islamic movements reflected the history lessons of 1920 and took a clear compromising position. In sum, the new political order that founded by the British in 1920 antagonized the Iraqi Shi'a and added more reasons to their existed disagreements over religious history. The Shi'a now became embittered not only because of deprivation of Caliphate but also because of their unfortunate political lot that resulted from the alliance of the British and the Sunni elite. Modern political betrayal added to old historical literature to forge the memory of Iraqi Shi'a. This explain, to some extent, many episodes that took place in Iraq after 2003. Indeed, Gertrud Bell was present at the very moment of creating the Iraqi state in

1920 and her ghost apparently was existent soon after 2003.

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² Independent, 5/3/2013

³ As far as I know, no research has been done about this interesting topic, which might be considered as part of Iraqi popular culture. However, I found recently an article written by Shubar, S.J, *Al Alam, fikron wa sijn, maqalat fi alsayasa wal alim wal mujtamaa'*, Al Arif lil Matboo'a, Beirut-Lebanon-2014, pp.299-305.

⁴ Hassan al-'Alawi, *al-Iraq al-Americay*, Dar al-Zawra-London, 2005, p.25.

⁵ Kashif al-Ghita, Muhammad Hussain, *'Uqood Hayati*, 2012, p.119.

⁶ *Selected Letters of GB*, A Pelican Book, 1st published, 1953, p.249.

⁷ Kashif al-Ghita, M H, *al-Muthul al-'Alya fi al-Islam lafi Bahamdoon*, Beirut-1980, pp.17-20.

⁸ Al-'Alawi Hassan, *al-Tatherat al-Turkayya fi al-Mashrooa' al-Qawmi fi al-Iraq*, pp.81-97,

⁹ Ibid, pp.102-21. See also pp.125-30.

¹⁰ *Al-Adhwa*, No.3, pp.97-104 & No.4, pp.145-52. See the previous chapter

¹¹ *Al-Adhwa*, No.6-7, pp.97-104

¹² See for example, *Al-Adhwa*, No.6-7, 1965, pp.251-5.

¹³ *Al-Iyman*, No. 7 & 8 April-May, 1964, pp.1-8.

¹⁴ Mousasat al-Dirasat al-Islamayya, *al-Iraq bayna al-Madhi wal Hakhir wal Mustaqbal*, Beirut, pp.838-87. n.d.

¹⁵ About the Jihad Campaign, see al-Wardi, 'Ali, *Lamahat*, ibid, vol, 4, pp, 127-48.

¹⁶ Vinogradov, Amal, the 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of the Tribes in National Politics, *IJMES*, vol, 3, No, 2 (April. 1972), pp.123-39, see, p.133; Atiyah, G, (1973) *Iraq, 1908-1921: A Socio-Political Study*, the Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, Beirut , pp.229-30; al-Hasani, *al-Thoura al-Iraqia al-Koubra*, ibid, footnote, p.58; idem, *Thawrat al-Najaf*, Beirut-1982, pp.24-30.

¹⁷ Al-Shibibi, M R, *Thawrat al-Najaf, al-Thaqafat al-Jadeedah*, No. 4, 1969, pp. 281-340; Atiyah, G, ibid, p.232; al-Hasani, A A, *Thawrat al-Najaf*, ibid, p.46; al-Nifisi, A, *Dour al-Shi'a fi Tadhawir al-Iraq al-Siyasi al-Hadeeth*, Beirut, Dar al-Nahar, 1972 , pp.61-3.



¹⁸ Al-Wardi, *Lamahat*, ibid. vol.5/1, pp, 62-3; al-Hasani, *al-Thoura al-Iraqia al-Koubra*, ibid, p.61.

¹⁹ Sir Wilson, Arnold, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920*, Oxford University Press, London-1931, pp.276-7; Tripp, Charles, *A History of Iraq*, Cambridge University Press, UK-2007, p.43

²⁰ *Selected Letters of Gertrude Bell*, ibid, p.245.

²¹ Vinogradov, Amal, the 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered, ibid, pp.135-6.

²² Sluglett, P, *Britain in Iraq, Contriving King and Country*, I.B.Tauris-London-New York, 2007, p.221.

²³ Goodman, Susan, *Gertrude Bell*, Berg Publishers, 1985, p.99.

²⁴ Sluglett, P, *Britain in Iraq*, p.27.

²⁵ Goodman, S, ibid, pp.

²⁶

http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/letter_details.php?letter_id=425 accessed on 11/ 05/2013.

²⁷ Goodman, S, ibid, p.102.

²⁸ Rich.P, *Iraq and Imperialism* Thomas, Lyell's *The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia*, Cambridge-1991, p.5.

²⁹ Al-Nifisi, 'A, ibid, p.123.

³⁰ Nasr, V, *the Shia Revival, How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York-London, 1st edition, 2006, pp.185-6.

³¹ Al-Nifisi, *Dour al-Shi'a*, ibid, p.60.

³² Atiyyah, G, ibid, p.232. See also al-Shibibi, ibid, p.303, p.330.

³³ F.O. 371/3397/165202, Collection of Fortnightly Reports, by the Civil Commissioner. Report No. 12 April 15 to May 1, 1918, cited in Atiyyah, G, ibid, p.233.

³⁴ About this issue, see al-'Alawi, Hadi, *Fi al-Din wal Turath*, Dar al-Talee'a, Beirut, 1973, pp.129-33; al-Wardi, *Lamahat*, ibid. v- 1982, p.46, 47, 76; al-Shibibi, M R, ibid, pp. 281-340.

See al-Wardi, 'A, *Lamahat Ijtimayya*, vol, 5ol.5/2, pp.266-7. See also about al-Yazdi, Atiyyah, G, ibid, p.232; al-Hasani, A A, *Thawrat al-Najaf*, Beirut-1982, p.46, 47, 76; al-Shibibi, M R, ibid, pp. 281-340.

³⁵ See al-Wardi, 'A, *Lamahat Ijtimayya*, vol, 5-part 2, p.267.

³⁶ Ibid, vol, 5-part 1, p.39.

³⁷ Jurgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism, A Theoretical Overview*, Markus Wiener Publishers-Princeton, 3rd printing 1999.

³⁸ I am here purposely borrowing the term coined by Abbas Kadhim in his new book, *Reclaiming*

Iraq: The 1920 Revolution and the Founding of the Modern State, University of Texas Press-2012, pp.154-9.

³⁹ About Sunni political thought, see for example, Crone, P, *Medieval Islamic Political Thought*. Edinburgh University Press-2005, Ch, 16.pp.219-47. For modern new interpretation, see Shaikh Muhammad al-Ghazali's view, in Abu-Rabi', I, *Contemporary Arab Thought, Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History*, Pluto Press, London-2004, 1st published, pp.227-8.

⁴⁰ For good account of Shi'a theory of political authority, see Lambton, A K, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, Oxford University Press-1985, pp.219-87; Sachedina, 'A A, *The Just Ruler, (al-Sultan al-'adil) in Shi'ite Islam*, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 1988, Ch,3, pp.89-118.